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Constitutional Criminal Litigation
By Andrew H. Marshall*

I.

INTRODUCTION

During 1980 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
decided well over 200 cases in the constitutional law/criminal area, including direct criminal appeals, collateral attacks on both state and federal criminal convictions, and a handful of cases arising in other contexts.
The typical opinion addresses and resolves multiple assignments of error,
which compounds the difficulty of organizing decisions into precise, discrete categories. The quantity and diversity of litigation in the area requires that a survey be limited to a fraction of the decided cases. The
selection process utilized in the preparation of this survey can only be
described as arbitrary, with two criteria predominating. First, an attempt
was made to discuss cases that more or less span the broad spectrum of
issues in the area. Second, an attempt was made to select those cases that
would be of most interest and value to the practitioner.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT
In Penthouse International,Ltd. v. McAuliffe,1 separate complaints
were filed by a number of magazine publishers seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief agaist the Solicitor General of Fulton County, Georgia. In
essence, the complainants alleged that McAuliffe had acted in bad faith
in effecting the prosecution of individuals for violations of Georgia law
proscribing the distribution of obscene materials.' Acting without specific
* Member of the firm of Henry & Marshall, Athens, Georgia. Emory University (B.A.
1970); University of Georgia (J.D. 1973). Member of the State Bar of Georgia.
1. 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1980).
2. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2101 (1977). This statute provides in pertinent part:
(b) Material is obscene if: (1) to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, taken as a whole, it predominantly appeals to the prurient in-

terest, that is a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion; (2) the
material taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value, and (3) the material depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
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instructions concerning either particular magazines or the application of
the criminal statute, s investigators would visit various retail establishments where they would purchase magazines and examine the contents. If
the investigators thought that a mazagine was obscene, they would question the manager about his knowledge of the magazine's contents. If the
answer was affirmative, an arrest was then made. If the retailer replied
that he was not aware of the magazine's contents, the investigator would
return on the following day and would arrest the retailer if the magazine
was still displayed. Plaintiffs, including the publishers of Penthouse,
Playboy, and Oui, attacked this procedure under the first and fourteenth
amendments and argued that it created an informal system of unconstitutional prior restraint.
The court gave short shrift to the contention that warrantless arrests
were appropriate under Georgia Code Ann. § 27-2074 because an offense
was being committed in the officer's presence. Finding that the magazines
were presumptively protected under the first amendment, the court held
that a retailer or distributor was accordingly entitled to greater procedural protections than those proposed, in view of the inherent difficulties in
making a determination of obscenity. The court held that McAuliffe's investigators could not determine whether an offense had been committed
in their presence and therefore could not rely on the statute to make a
warrantless arrrest.
The court also was unpersuaded by the contention that no "seizures"
took place because distributors and retailers voluntarily removed the
publications from their shelves. In view of McAuliffe's highly publicized,
systematic plan of visits by his investigators to magazine retailers during
which numerous arrests were made, the court found that a constitutional
"seizure" had occurred. Since the procedure did not include review of the
magazines by a neutral, detached magistrate concerning the propriety of

conduct specifically defined in subparagraphs (i) through (v) below: (i) acts of sexual intercourse, heterosexual or homosexual, normal or perverted, actual or similated; (ii) acts of masturbation; (iii) acts involving excretory functions or lewd exhibition of the genitals; (iv) acts of bestiality or the fondling of sex organs of
animals; (v) sexual acts of flagellation, torture and other violence indicating a sadomasochistic sexual relationship; (c) Additionally, any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs is obscene
material under this section. (d) Material, not otherwise obscene, may be obscene
under this section if the distribution thereof, or the offer to do so, or the possession with the intent to do so is a commercial exploitation of erotica solely for the
sake of their prurient appeal.
3. Id.
4. GA. CODs ANN. § 27-207 (1978). This statute provides in pertinent part: "(a) An arrest
without a warrant if the offense is committed in
for a crime may be made by an officer.
his presence. .. "
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the "seizure," the court held that an informal system of prior restraint
did exist. After its review of the controlling decisions of the Supreme
Court,6 the court concluded that the system of prior restraint contravened the first and fourteenth amendments. Because the magazines were
presumptively protected, the interposition of a magistrate was required
before an arrest or other warrant could be issued for the seizure of allegedly obscene material.
A second set of complaints by the magazine publishers in the district
court required appellate review of the January 1978 issues of Penthouse,
Playboy, and Oui in order to review the declaratory judgment of the district court that these magazines were not obscene. The court was thus
called upon to apply the three-pronged Miller' obscenity test:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community
standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest . . .; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 7
Each element of this test must be satisfied before a publication may be
adjudicated obscene8 and therefore outside the protection of the first
amendment. While the first and second prongs require application of
community standards, the third does not.' In determining community
standards, finders of fact may permissibly draw on their own knowledge
of the "average person" in making necessary conclusions.10 Since the
lower court had held that the magazines were not obscene, the Fifth Circuit was faced with the threshold question of determining the proper
standard of review.
Although the Supreme Court had held that appellate courts were required to review findings independently under the second and third
prongs of the Miller standards, it had not explicitly declared that independent review of whether the "average person" would find that the work
appeals to the prurient interest was appropriate." The court nevertheless
5. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973); Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973).
6. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See also Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49 (1973); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S.
115 (1973); United States v. Twelve 200 Foot Reels of Super-8 Mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123
(1973).

7. 413 U.S. at 24.
8.
9.
10.
R.R.,
11.

610 F.2d at 1363.
Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
Schultz v. Pennsylvania R.R., 350 U.S. 523 (1956); Stone v. New York, C. & St. L.
344 U.S. 407 (1953).
610 F.2d at 1364.
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proceeded to review the magazines independently and concluded that
taken as a whole, Penthouse and Oui did appeal to the prurient interest.12 The court, finding that the second and third prongs of the obscenity
test were also satisfied, reversed this portion of the district court's declaratory judgment.
The majority's conclusion was legitimately questioned by Judge
Kravitch who pointed out that the requirement of "community standards" under the first prong of the obscenity test logically suggested a
variable standard dependent upon time and place.' 3 Since the district
judge was a member of the community from which the standard was to be
gleaned, and since controlling authority was well settled that a finder of
fact-in this case, the judge-could draw upon his own knowledge of the
"average person" in the community," the majority's conclusion that the
magazines appealed to the prurient interest was suspect on any theory of
principled decision-making. Indeed, the process by which the prurient interest conclusion was reached is encapsulated in the following:
When taking either magazine as a whole, a combination of the pictorial
depictions as well as several items, consisting of unsolicited letters and
comments giving an in-depth description of sexual conduct, can be said
to appeal to a shameful interest in sex. Therefore, 'Penthouse' and 'Oui'
satisfy the first prong of the Miller test. 5
Although concurring Judge Clark provided assurance that he was sufficiently familiar with the Atlanta citizenry to make a "sure, true judgment" about whether the magazines in question appeal to the prurient
interest of the "average person" in the community," his observations
merely underscore the nature of the intractable problems associated with
a determination of whether material presumptively protected by the first
amendment is obscene.
In another case considering the first amendment implications of allegedly obscene material, Septum, Inc. v. Keller, 7 a corporation engaged in
the business of exhibiting motion pictures brought suit against the district attorney in Clayton County, Georgia, and requested declaratory and
injunctive relief against threatened enforcement of Georgia's obscenity
statute.'" The suit followed notification by prosecuting authorities of an
12. The court affirmed the declaratory judgment of the district court that Playboy was
not obscene. Id. at 1373.
13. 610 F.2d at 1374-75 (Kravitch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14. See note 10 supra, and accompanying text.
15. 610 F.2d at 1364.
16. Id. at 1374.
17. 614 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1980).
18. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2101 (1977). See note 2 supra.
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intention to initiate criminal prosecutions if Septum insisted on showing
a film about which numerous citizens had complained. An informal arrangement had previously been entered into in which the district attorney
agreed to warn Septum in the event he intended to proceed with prosecutions against any allegedly obscene movies. Upon receipt of notice of intention to initiate criminal proceedings, Septum discontinued exhibition
of the film and filed suit.
The principal questions on appeal were whether the district court erred
in declining to accept jurisdiction because of the absence of an "actual
controversy" under article III of the United States Constitution and
whether abstention was appropriate. The court had no difficulty in finding the presence of a justiciable controversy between parties having adverse legal interests, notwithstanding the fact that no criminal prosecution had been initiated against Septum. This conclusion followed from
plaintiff's allegation of an intention to engage in conduct affording a measure of first amendment protection. The court held that plaintiff was not
required to await the actual initiation of criminal proceedings in order to
obtain relief when a credible threat of prosecution existed.
Due to the absence of any pending state proceedings and because of
Septum's announced intention to avoid the risk of criminal prosecution
by discontinuing the exhibition of the film, abstention under Younger v.
Harris" and its progeny would be improper. Questions about the propriety of federal intervention were thus inappropriate. Septum was required
to choose some forum in which to litigate its constitutional claim, and it
was not required to seek vindication of it federal rights via a state declaratory judgment action. Although the district court reasoned that federal declaratory relief was not precluded, 0 it erred in holding that it was
not required to entertain the claim. The court accordingly reversed the
district court's application of principles of discretionary abstention and
remanded the matter for further proceedings.
A different genre of first amendment attack on a penal statute was un1 which concerned an appeal from the
dertaken in Sayer v. Sandstrom,"
denial of the writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner was convicted under a
county ordinance that criminally proscribed loitering "in any place with
one or more persons knowing that a narcotic or dangerous drug . . . is

being unlawfully used or possessed.""12 Sawyer was prosecuted after police
observed him standing by suspected narcotics dealers during the consummation of a number of drug sales. Sawyer contended that his conviction
19.
20.
(1971).
21.
22.

401 U.S. 37 (1971).
See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66
615 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1980).
Code of Metropolitan Dade County, § 21-30.1(b)(2) (1974).
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was unlawfully obtained under the first and fourteenth amendments because it punished his mere association with individuals known to be in
possession of or using narcotics.
While the state court had construed the loitering ordinance to require
knowing comradeship or companionship with drug users or possessors, 8
the law did not require active participation in any narcotics offense under
traditional aiding and abetting principles. In granting the prayer for
habeas relief, the Fifth Circuit was careful to note the difference between
petitioner's overbreadth attack and the often confused concept of vagueness that the district court had addressed. That petitioner was afforded
constitutionally adequate notice that his conduct was criminally proscribed, thereby avoiding the vice of unconstitutionally vague statutes,
was beside the point. The real focus was on whether the petitioner's first
amendment rights were violated by an overbroad statute that punished
ordinary associational conduct in a public place under circumstances not
constituting a breach of the peace. Although the purpose of the ordinance
was praiseworthy, the court emphasized the availability of other means of
achieving the same objectives without chilling the first amendment rights
of persons engaged in essentially innocent associational conduct. Because
the breadth of the ordinance was not justified by an compelling interest,
the denial of the petition for habeas relief was reversed.
III.

A.

FOURTH AMENDMENT

Good Faith Exception to Exclusionary Rule

Perhaps the most significant decisions to active practitioners of criminal law were those in which fourth amendment issues were litigated. The
trend towards restriction of the exclusionary rule received substantial
im4
petus from the en banc decision in United States v. Williams.2

During the period of her appeal for possession of heroin from the
Northern District of Ohio, Joanne Williams arrived at the Atlanta airport
after a nonstop flight from Los Angeles. As fate would have it, she was
recognized by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent who
had previously arrested her on the narcotics violation in Ohio. The agent
had been told that a condition of Williams' appeal bond required her continued presence in that state. Consequently, he approached her, identified
himself, asked for her identification, and inquired if she had permission
to leave Ohio. When Williams indicated that she did not, she was arrested
for violating the travel restrictions in the order admitting her to bail
pending appeal. A search of her person incident to the arrest uncovered a
23.

State v. Sawyer, 346 So. 2d 1071, 1075 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).

24. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3617 (Feb. 24, 1981).
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packet of heroin. A search warrant for her luggage was subsequently executed, and a large quantity of heroin was seized.
Judge Politz wrote Part I of the court's opinion, which focused upon
the validity of Williams' arrest and particularly on an inquiry into the
circumstances under which DEA agents were empowered to make warrantless arrests.2 5 Because the circumstances were insufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest for bail jumping under 18 U.S.C. § 3150,6 the court
considered whether violation of the travel restriction was an act of contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401(3).7 The court, finding that a willful violation of the travel restriction was properly considered contemptuous, further concluded that imposition of contempt sanctions would have
punishment of a past infraction as its primary aim. It was therefore appropriate to characterize the contempt as criminal.
The court then turned to the question of whether criminal contempt is
an "offense against the United States" within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. §
878(3)28 so that a warrantless arrrest could be justified. Although the
court noted that courts had authority to initiate contempt .charges under
Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, it emphasized that
such charges could be initiated in other ways, principally by an indictment, without any action by the court. Hence, violation of the travel restrictions was an "offense against the United States" that was committed
in the presence of the DEA agent, thereby justifying a warrantless arrest.
The incidental search of Williams' person that disclosed heroin was accordingly legitimized, and the court likewise upheld the validity of the
seizure of heroin from her luggage.
Part II of the court's opinion's was written by Judges Gee and Vance,
and involved an entirely different approach to the circumstances leading
to the warrantless arrest and the subsequent seizure of contraband. In
their view, the exclusionary rule would not bar use of the seized narcotics
regardless of whether violation of the travel restrictions amounted to

25. 21 U.S.C. § 878(3) (Supp. IH 1979) provides in pertinent part:
Any officer or employer of the Drug Enforcement Administration and designated
by the Attorney General may. . . (3) make arrests without a warrant (A) for any
offense against the United States committed in his presence, or (B) for any felony,
cognizable under the laws of the United States, if he has probable cause to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a felony ...
26. This statute authorizes the imposition of criminal penalties for a willful failure to
appear before the court or a judicial officer.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (1976). The statute provides in pertinent part: "A court of the
United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such
contempt of its authority and none other, as. . . (3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful
writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command."
28. 21 U.S.C. § 878(3) (Supp. Ill 1979). See note 25 supra.
29. 622 F.2d at 840.
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criminal contempt justifying a warrantless arrest. This conclusion rested
on the identification of the rationale underlying the exclusionary rule,;
and the finding that the actions of the DEA agent were both reasonable
and taken in good faith.
It is well settled that the exclusionary rule is not mandated by the
fourth amendment but is a judge-made rule to enforce constitutional requirements. It is justified on the theory that exclusion of illegally seized
evidence will deter police misconduct in the future.3 0 Application of the
rule has been criticized by numerous writers and judges who contend that
its by-product-impairment of the truth-finding function with the corollary of freeing guilty criminals and endangering society-is too high a
price to pay for any deterrent effect.3 1 The court recited a long series of
recent decisions in which the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit had
limited the application of the rule in a variety of circumstances.3
Because the agent's subjective good faith was not questioned, the court
emphasized the reasonableness of his conduct in believing the that the
crime of bail jumping had been committed in his presence so as to authorize a warrantless arrest. The agent had previously arrested Williams,
knew of her conviction, and also knew that her presence in Atlanta violated the travel restriction mandated by the order admitting her to bail
pending appeal. Since the agent's mistake about the legal intricacies of
bail jumping was both made in good faith and reasonable, application of
the exlusionary rule was improper. The court went on to declare:
Henceforth in this circuit, when evidence is sought to be excluded because of police conduct leading to its discovery, it will be open to the
proponent of the evidence to urge that the conduct in question, if mistaken or unauthorized, was yet taken in a reasonable, good faith belief
that it was proper. If the court so finds, it shall not apply the exclusionary rule to the evidence."
Though only time can tell the complete implications of the explicit creation of the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, Part II of
this decision will most assuredly provide prosecuting authorities with an
important tool with which to resist attempts to suppress incriminating
evidence. On the other hand, defense attorneys can find consolation in
the court's emphasis upon both the objective and subjective prongs of the
"good faith" exception." Evidence of subjective bad faith on the part of
30. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338 (1974).
31. 622 F.2d at 841.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 846-47.
34. Id. at 841 n.4a.
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law enforcement agents would completely undercut the rationale for
avoiding application of the exclusionary rule, i.e., that the constable will
not be deterred if he is not aware that he is acting unlawfully. More importantly, the claim of subjective good faith must be buttressed by circumstances evidencing objectively reasonable conduct on the part of a
reasonably trained police officer.85 Only when both elements coalesce can
unlawfully seized evidence escape the operation of the exclusionary rule.
B.

"Beepers"

The constitutional ramifications inherent in the use of "beepers" was
considered by the Fifth Circuit under factually dissimilar circumstances
in United States v. Lewiss' and United States v. Michael.87 In Lewis,
defendants arranged for the purchase of a large quantity of chemicals to
be used in manufacturing phencyclidine (PCP). When the supplier notified the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) of the large order of
piperidine, a substance on DEA's "watch list," a plan was devised to ship
the substance in a special drum which contained a built-in tracking device or "beeper." After delivering the drum to the chemical supplier for
its ultimate shipment to defendants, an application for an order authorizing the use of the beeper was made and granted. The United States magistrate issuing the warrant was not advised that the beeper drum was already prepared and ready for use. Use of the beeper eventually led to the
seizure of evidence that was admitted at trial. Upon its examination of
the nature of the beeper, as well as the "swamp of beeper law," the court
concluded that the beeper intruded on personal property less than a wiretap but more than visual observation, and held that the fourth amendment was indeed implicated by its use."
The defendants argued that they had a proprietary interest at the time
the piperidine was transferred because, under the Texas version 8 ' of the
Uniform Commercial Code, they acquired title to the chemical at the
time it was identified to their contract with the supplier. The court held,
however, that defendants lacked any property interest recognized by the
fourth amendment in the piperidine or the drum until they took possession of it. The constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches
and seizures did not prohibit the placement of a beeper in the drum
before they obtained possession of it. Since a warrant was obtained prior
to the delivery of the drum, the subsequent use of the beeper was proper.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
621 F.2d 1382 (5th Cir. 1980).
622 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1980).
621 F.2d at 1387.
TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.401, 2.501 (Vernon 1968).
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Upholding the denial of the motion to suppress, the court refused to
decide whether warrantless use of beepers would violate the fourth
amendment. 0
.The legality of a warrantless installation of a beeper on a private vehicle was squarely raised in United States v. Michael.41 In Michael, a motion to suppress was directed to evidence 'seized pursuant to a warrant on
premises, the location of which had been ascertained as a result of the
warrantless installation of a beeper on the exterior of defendant's van.
The court examined the two divergent analytical approaches to the issue.
Under one view, the installation of a beeper was neither a search nor an
invasion of privacy subject to fourth amendment protection because it
represented a minimal intrusion upon an individual's privacy and property substantially equivalent to a permissible warrantless inspection of a
vehicle identification number.42 On the other hand, the defendant argued
that use of a beeper without a warrant was a far more substantial intrusion in duration and scope which impinged upon his right of personal
8
security, liberty, and private property.4
After an extensive review of the authorities, the court rejected the government contention that the sole fourth amendment inquiry was whether
an individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements
when using a vehicle on which a beeper had been installed. The court
refused to overlook the fact that the installation of the beeper had been
accomplished by a trespass, despite an arguably low expectation of privacy respecting the exterior of the vehicle. When viewed in connection
with the continuous nature of the invasion of privacy respecting an individual's movements into the indefinite future, the court ruled that absent
exigent circumstances, prior judicial authorization was required before a
beeper could be installed. Left open was the question of whether reasonable suspicion or the more stringent showing of probable cause was re44
quired to justify the issuance of a warrant.

40. 621 F.2d at 1388-89.
41. 622 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1980). The issue faced by the panel had been previously considered by the court in United States v. Holmes, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976)(en banc). The
court was evenly split on the question of whether a warrant was required for installation of
a beeper on a private vehicle. Thus, the judgment of the panel, which unanimously held that
a warrant was required, was affirmed. United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859 (5th Cir.), aff'd
537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
42. See United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Hufford,
539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976); United States v. Holmes, 537 F.2d
227, 230 (5th Cir. 1976) (dissenting opinion).
43. There are numerous commentators which support this view and which were cited by
the court. 622 F.2d at 748.

44.

Id.
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C. Drug Courier Profile
Encounters between DEA agents and persons fitting characteristics of
the "drug courier profile" in Atlanta's airport were the subject of litigation in numerous cases decided during the survey period. Despite the
quantity of litigation and the similarities in factual patterns, this area of
fourth amendment jurisprudence continues to be shrouded in uncertainty. The lack of definitive constitutional standards is a by-product of
the fragmented decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Mendenhall,4s in which the court found no constitutional problem in the
seizure of heroin from a suspected drug courier, but by different analytical approaches. Two panels of the Fifth Circuit have squarely held that
until an authoritative Supreme Court ruling is forthcoming, it is bound
by the holding in United States v. Elmore47 that no "seizure" occurs
within the meaning of the fourth amendment when agents employing a
drug courier profile request airline passengers to produce their tickets, so
long as the objective circumstances do not support an inference that the
passenger's cooperation is involuntary or the product of force or coercion. '8 Resolution of this threshold question is critical, for once problems
respecting the initial encounter are overcome, subsequent questioning frequently produces circumstances authorizing more significant intrusions
into areas unquestionably subject to fourth amendment protection, including arrests, searches and seizures.
In United States v. Pulvano,4 s the defendant indicated to DEA agents
that the name on the plane ticket that he produced at their request was
his, although his driver's license indicated that the name used was false.
Furthermore, although agents had seen him place a small suitcase in an
airport locker, he told them that he did not have any luggage. The suitcase was later seized although the defendant refused to consent to a
45.

The characteristics of the drug courier profile have been described as follows:
(a) unusual nervousness; (b) no luggage or very limited luggage (c) possession of
an unusually large amount of cash, especially when in bills of small denominations; (d) unusual itinerary, taking circuitous routes from cities known to be
source cities for narcotics, such as flying to New Orleans from Los Angeles by way
of St. Louis; (e) arriving from a known narcotics source city; (f) paying for an
airline ticket in currency of small demoninations; (g) purchasing a one-way ticket;
(h) use of an alias; (i) use of a false telephone number on an airline reservation; (j)
placing a telephone call immediately upon arrival at the airport; and (k) travel by
a known narcotics trafficker.
United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 914 (5th Cir. 1978).
46. 446 U.S. 544 (1980). See also Reid v. Georgia, U.S. (1980) (per curiam).
47. 595 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1979).
48. See United States v. Pulvano, 629 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1980).
49. 629 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1980).
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search of it, and after a patdown of his outer clothing revealed nothing
incriminating, he was allowed to continue his journey without the suitcase. Moments later, agents realized that he could be arrested for falsely
identifying himself during this initial encounter." After his arrest, a more
thorough search of his person revealed cocaine. Concluding that probable
cause for the arrest did exist, the search of his person was validated. 1
The court also affirmed the finding of the trial court that defendant had
voluntarily consented to a post-arrest search of the suitcase.
In two other cases 2 initial encounters disclosed plane tickets of passengers in names different from those indicated by other forms of identification when produced. In both instances, the use of a false name on the
plane ticket led to warrantless searches and seizure of controlled substances that were the subject of motions to suppress. In both, denial of
the motions was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit based upon the lower
court's resolution of conflicting testimony about a consent search in favor
of law enforcement agents. Although the defendant in United States v.
Bowles s produced both identification and a plane ticket indicating use of
his true name, the officer who questioned him recognized the name as one
associated with narcotics in the area. On the basis of disputed facts, the
court found-that Bowles had voluntarily consented to a search of his person that disclosed the presence of narcotics. His conviction was affirmed
on appeal.
D. Miscellany
Panels of the Fifth Circuit reached different fourth amendment conclusions in arguably similar circumstances in United States v. Cueto' and
United States v. Quigley.85 Cueto concerned the use of a "hoax bomb" in
connection with an attempted bank robbery that ultimately led to the
defendant's indictment and conviction. At the time, a nationwide investigation was underway into a series of bank robberies in which this modus
operandi was utilized. Evidence discovered in an abandoned car coupled
with information developed from this investigation led agents to suspect
that the would-be robber(s) could be found at one of the motels along a
particular highway. A photograph was displayed to a motel owner who
50. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2506 (1977) provides: "A person who gives a false name or address to a law enforcement officer in the lawful discharge of his official duties, with the
intent of misleading the officer as to his identity is guilty of a misdemeanor."
51. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
52. United States v. Turner, 628 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Fry, 622 F.2d
1218 (5th Cir. 1980).
53. 625 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1980).
54. 611 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1980).
55. 631 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1980).
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thought he recognized the person depicted. Further discussion of the
abortive robbery led to disclosure of information that a flare had been
seen in a garbage receptacle earlier that day. Other information led
agents to another motel where they knocked on the door of a room in
which the suspects were believed to be located. When the door was
opened slightly, agents burst into the room, where they arrested and
handcuffed two men. The men were later removed to another room. A
thorough search of the room uncovered incriminating evidence which was
the subject of an unsuccessful motion to suppress.
In resolving the fourth amendment claim, the Fifth Circuit distinguished between, on the one hand, the evidence seized from inside a
suitbag and between the mattresses, and on the other, those items that
appeared in plain view on the table and beds when the room was entered.
Seizures of the latter were held lawful. The court then considered
whether the warrantless seizure of the former items could be justified as a
search incident to arrest under Chimel v. California." Because the suspects were handcuffed and may have been in an adjoining room, they
"were certainly in no position to reach concealed weapons or to grab and
destroy evidence in the suitbag or between the mattresses." 57 The court
thus reversed the denial of the motion to suppress items seized from
those places.
The defendant in Quigley" also argued that the warrantless seizure of
a pistol was unlawful because it was outside the permissible scope of a
search incident to arrest. At the time of his arrest, federal agents were
attempting to locate him as an escapee. By tracing a telephone call from
Quigley to his girl friend, they learned that he was occupying a motel
room. When he opened the door, armed agents burst into the room and
handcuffed a naked, crying Quigley, placing him against a wall. Quigley's
female companion gestured toward a bed when questioned about the
presence of a'weapon. Beneath the mattress, a pistol was found which
formed the basis of defendant's conviction for unlawful possession of a
firearm.
As in Cueto,59 the court looked to Chime160 for discovery of the principles governing resolution of the fourth amendment claim. Noting that
pre-Chimel jurisprudence authorized an incident search for the entire
premises in which the arrest occurred, the court interpreted Chimel to

56. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Assuming a valid arrest, this landmark decision holds that a
warrantless search of the arrestee's person and the area within his reach from which he
might obtain a weapon or destroy incriminating evidence is lawful.
57. 611 F.2d at 1062.
58. 631 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1980).
59. 611 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1980).
60. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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limit advertent incident searches to the arrestee's person and the area
within his immediate control. The warrantless seizure of the pistol was
lawful notwithstanding the fact that it was outside the scope of an incident search because it was not "unreasonable" under the fourth amendment. Though seizure of the pistol could hardly be characterized as
"inadvertent," it passed constitutional muster as a "reasonable precautionary search in the face of a serious and demonstrable potentiality for
danger to the arresting officers" 61 who reasonably believed the suspect
was armed and that the girl was an accomplice. Thus, in substance if not
in form, the panel applied the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule"' based upon a perception that the search and seizure was both objectively reasonable and accompanied by subjective good faith.
In United States v. Cole, ss the court considered the permissible scope
of a search undertaken pursuant to a validly issued "premises"" warrant,
which resulted in defendant's conviction on five counts of unlawful possession of firearms. Police officers were about to execute a warrant authorizing a search for amphetamines when defendant pulled his truck
into a carport attached to the apartment to be searched. He was immediately frisked when he stepped from the truck, and a small pistol was
seized from his belt. As the frisk took place beside his truck, the door of
which remained open, officers observed white powder, syringes, and another gun, all of which were seized. After a successful search for amphetamines inside the apartment was concluded, a more thorough search of
the truck took place during which several other weapons were seized.
The court unanimously concluded that the frisk was unlawful, primarily because it violated the principle of Ybarra v.Illinois" that "mere
propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does
not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person.""
The panel did not agree, however, on whether the search was authorized
under United States v. Napoli,e7 which upheld the search of an automobile in the driveway of premises for which a valid warrant had been issued. The majority found no significant distinctions between the cases
and affirmed that portion of the district court's order which denied the
motion to suppress the items seized from the truck.
61. 631 F.2d at 419.
62. See note 24 supra, and accompanying text.
63. 628 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1980).
64. The warrant authorized a search of "the premises described as a one story duplex
family dwelling being the rear apartment, known and numbered as 303 Savannah, rear
apartment and a white Chevrolet with a blue top and Mag wheels and bearing Texas 79
plates EGB-81." 628 F.2d at 898.
65. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
66. Id. at 91 (citation omitted).
67. 530 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976).
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On the other hand, the dissenting judge emphasized two significant factors that were present in Napoli but not in the case under consideration:
(1) the vehicle was parked on the premises to be searched at the time the
officers arrived to execute the warrant; (2) the search of the premises did
not result in the seizure of LSD which the warrant had authorized. It was
reasonable to conclude that the permissible scope of a permises search
warrant includes anything at the location that is under the control of the
person whose effects are to be searched, from the point of view of both
magistrate and police officer. In contrast to Napoli, although the officers
executing the warrant observed Cole arrive, he was not listed as an occupant of the premises to be searched, and there was no apparent reason to
suspect his involvement with amphetamines. Because there were not exigent circumstances requiring an immediate search of the truck nor other
jusification for not obtaining a warrant, the dissent would have held the
seizure of firearms unlawful.

IV. FIFrH AMENDMENT
A.

Double Jeopardy

The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment received a considerable measure of judicial attention during 1980, principally in the continued analysis of the circumstances which constitute "manifest necessity"
for the declaration of mistrial, sua sponte and/or over defense objection.
The court also had occasion to hold authoritatively that no double jeopardy bar existed to the imposition of consecutive sentences for conspiracy
convictions for both importation and distribution of marijuana.
The latter issue was addressed by the court en banc in United States v.
Rodriquez."8 The defendants were indicted for offenses codified at 21
U.S.C. §§ 841, 952.69 Defendants had entered into an agreement that had
the twin objectives of importing and distributing a controlled substance.
Upon their conviction for both conspiracy offenses, consecutive sentences
were imposed. In order to ascertain the congressional intentions which led
to the enactment of the respective statutes, the court utilized the four
tools of statutory construction identified in Simpson v. United States70
"to determine whether Congress intended to subject the defendant to
multiple penalties for the single criminal transaction in which he en68. 612 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1980)(en banc).
69. The statutes concerned are parts of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified in titles 18, 21, 26, 31, 40,
42, 46 & 49).
70. 435 U.S. 6 (1978).
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gaged": 71 (1) the legislative history; (2) the principle that the more specific statute takes precedence over the terms of a general statute when
both address the same general concern; (3) the rule of lenity which commands that criminal penalties not be increased based upon an interpretation of statutes involving no more than a guess as to congressional intentions; and (4) an analysis of prosecutorial conduct as evidence of the
common perception of the statutes. 3
Recognizing that Simpson addressed statutes proscribing substantive
criminal offenses as opposed to conspiracies, the court additionally identified two other lines of precedent. With limited exceptions, the common
thread of the first line of cases in which consecutive sentences were held
improper was the presence of one or more convictions under the general
conspiracy statute.7 8 The second line of authority rejected a per se rule
prohibiting multiple convictions for conspiracy when only one conspiratorial agreement was shown, opting instead to resort to principles of statutory construction when specific conspiracy statutes were in issue.7 4 The
court found United States v. Marotta" particularly persuasive in upholding cumulative punishment for convictions under specific conspiracy statutes. In Marotta, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the particular intentions of
Congress in enacting statutes proscribing narcotics conspiracies, notwithstanding the common law principle that a single conspiracy is a single
crime. Application of the tools of statutory construction led to the conclusion that Congress intended to authorize consecutive sentences for conspiratorial agreements both to import and distribute marijuana.
The remaining question was whether such enactment offended the
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. The court found no authority for a double jeopardy limitation on the imposition of cumulative
sentences in a single prosecution for which Congress had so provided, although a measure of constitutional protection was available to congressional fragmentation of a conspiratorial agreement by the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the eighth amendment.7 6 Accordingly, the
court affirmed the imposition of cumulative punishment for marijuana
conspiracy convictions obtained in a single prosecutiQn, while it cautioned
that the imposition of cumulative sentences for narcotics conspiracies was

71. Id. at 12 (citing Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 155 (1977)).
72. 435 U.S. at 13-16.
73. See, e.g., Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49 (1942); United States v. Honneus,
508 F.2d 566 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975); United States v. Mori, 444
F.2d 240 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971).
74. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); United States
v. Marotta, 581 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1974).
75. 581 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1974).
76. 612 F.2d at 924.
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not required.
A series of Fifth Circuit cases decided during the survey period serves
as vivid illustration of the double jeopardy implications of declarations of
mistrial. If a mistrial is declared sua sponte and/or over defendant's objection, the permissibility of retrial depends upon whether the trial court
properly exercised its discretion in determining the existence of "manifest
necessity" for the mistrial. 7 On the other hand, the law is clear that a
defense motion for mistrial ordinarily eliminates any double jeopardy obstacle to retrial unless
prosecutorial misconduct "forces" a defense mo78
tion for mistrial.
Cherry v. Director, State Board of Corrections7 9 concerned a challenge
to a state robbery conviction via petition for a writ of habeas corpus. After jeopardy attached, the trial court was informed that a juror's mother
had died. Defense counsel refused to agree to proceed with a jury of
eleven persons and the court proceeded to declare a mistrial. In directing
that the petition for the writ of habeas corpus be granted, the Fifth Circuit rejected decisions in other courts which had held that the death of a
juror's relative constituted manifest necessity for a declaration of mistrial
as a matter of law. 80 Eschewing a per se approach, the court conclued that
the state court had shown inadequate concern for the defendant's important double jeopardy rights by failing to consider alternatives to mistrial
such as a continuance. Even though a trial court's mistrial declaration
was accorded great deference, the majority of the panel refused to find
"manifest necessity" for a mistrial on an ambiguous record.
Grooms v. Wainwright81 presents a much stronger case for finding
"manifest necessity." Grooms' defense to a robbery charge was coercion,
and he testified that his friend-accomplice threatened him with a thirtyeight caliber pistol unless he participated in the criminal scheme. During
the jury's deliberations, the trial court learned that upon request, a bailiff
had permitted his own thirty-eight caliber pistol to be examined in the
jury room. The court stated on the record that the need for a mistrial was
"manifest and urgent and absolute" and proceeded to terminate the proceeding. The trial court emphasized the fact that the make, shape, and
size of the pistol were critical factors in determining whether Grooms was
coerced. The Fifth Circuit held that retrial was justified because: (1) the
court showed awarness of the double jeopardy implications for such action; and (2) counsel was given an opportunity to object at a bench conference before the mistrial was declared as well as afterward. Even though
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
See, e.g., United States v. Jon, 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
613 F.2d 1262 (5th Cir. 1980).
See 53 A.L.R. 1062 (1928).
610 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1980).
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some less drastic alternative might have been utilized, the court refused
to find any abuse of discretion since jury examination of the pistol obviously impaired its ability to judge the defense offered solely on the basis
of properly admitted evidence.
United States v. Luttrells and United States v. Charettes exemplify
the difficulty of making the requisite showing of prosecutorial misconduct
sufficient to prevent retrial on double jeopardy grounds after a mistrial is
declared on defendant's motion or with his consent. Luttrell involved a
prosecution for conveying a weapon within a federal penitentiary. A mistrial was declared on defendant's motion after an FBI agent testified that
defendant refused to be questioned in the absence of an attorney. The
trial court expressly found that the objectionable testimony was inadvertently elicited and found no evidence of prosecutorial overreaching, gross
negligence, or intentional misconduct. Ruling that these findings were
properly reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard, the court affirmed the lower court's rejection of the double jeopardy claim.
In Charette, a mistrial was declared when a government witness testified that an exhibit was based in part on statements of the defendant that
had not been provided during discovery in contravention of Rule 16 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. As further evidence of
prosecutorial misconduct, defendant indicated that a number of documents were not provided to the defense until the morning of the trial. As
in Luttrell, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the trial court's finding of
prosecutorial good faith was not clearly erroneous, and it affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment.
A much stronger showing of prosecutorial misconduct was made in
United States v. Opager," although the Fifth Circuit deemed it insufficient to sustain the double jeopardy claim. Opager was indicted for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Prior to trial, the government
was ordered to disclose the whereabouts of a government informant. The
prosecution nevertheless refused to comply with this order, even after defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, and after the court again ordered the informant produced or his whereabouts disclosed. The subsequent conviction was reversed in part on the failure of the government to
comply with the court's order." When the case was scheduled for retrial,
a double jeopardy motion was filed and denied.
In examining defendant's claim, the court looked to United States v.
Kessler" for guidance. In Kessler, the government intentionally
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

609 F.2d 1190 (5th Cir. 1980).
625 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1980).
616 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1980).
United States v. Opager, 589 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1979).
530 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1976).
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presented false evidence to the court. Defendant's motion for mistrial was
held not to constitute a barrier to final termination of the proceedings
under the double jeopardy clause. The first question faced by the court
was whether Kessler was applicable since no motion for mistrial had been
made. In dictum, the court concluded that no logical distinction could be
drawn when the prosecutorial overreaching was asserted in a motion to
dismiss as opposed to a motion for mistrial because double jeopardy values were similarly implicated by the prospect of successive prosecutions.
Nevertheless, the court refused to decide the question directly because,
assuming its applicability, the court found no evidence of prosecutorial
overreaching or bad faith. The second conviction was accordingly
affirmed.
The resolution of the double jeopardy issue in this fashion is questionable. But for the egregious prosecutorial misconduct, defendant could
have reasonably expected to have the charges resolved in a single criminal
proceeding. Because of prosecutorial misconduct, she was required to undergo successive prosecutions for the same offense. As the Fifth Circuit
noted, logic compels the conclusion that double jeopardy policies were
clearly implicated. What is difficult to understand is the court's reluctance to characterize the willful disobedience of a lawful court order as
"prosecutorial overreaching" or "bad faith." Disclosure of the whereabouts of the informant had been deemed material to the defense,87 and
the appellate court reversed the first conviction because of what was characterized as an affront to the court. It is hardly surprising that the panel
considering the first conviction did not employ the jargon of double jeopardy jurisprudence since that issue was not properly before it. However,
the repeated, purposeful refusal to obey a lawful court order when such
conduct prejudices the defense and subjects the defendant to successive
prosecutions would appear to be in and of itself sufficiently egregious to
warrant invocation of the double jeopardy bar.
In Abney v. United States," the Supreme Court held that the denial of
a motion to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds was an
appealable order. In view of the well-settled principle that the filing of a
notice of appeal ordinarily divests the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed, Abney afforded defense attorneys with an opportunity to postpone
trial on the merits indefinitely when a pretrial double jeopardy motion
was denied. This opportunity was significantly narrowed in United States
v. Dunbar.89 Dunbar was convicted of a narcotics conspiracy at a time
when he faced a second indictment for distributing controlled substances.
87.
88.
89.

589 F.2d at 804.
431 U.S. 651 (1977).
611 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
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He pleaded his conspiracy conviction as a double jeopardy bar to trial on
the second indictment, and argued that both trials would involve use of
the same evidence. On the day set for trial, the district court overruled
Dunbar's motion to dismiss and notice of appeal was immediately filed.
The court refused to abort the proceedings, and a jury convicted Dunbar
on all counts.
Finding that the appeal was both frivolous and dilatory, the Fifth Circuit refused to apply woodenly the divestiture of jurisdiction rule, notwithstanding the fact that the denial of the double jeopardy motion was
unquestionably an appealable order." The court accordingly exercised its
supervisory powers and held that "an appeal from the denial of a frivolous double jeopardy motion does not divest the district court of jurisdiction to proceed with trial, if the district court has found the motion to be
'
frivolous."91
The court noted that the pretrial appellate review was still
available via issuance of a writ of mandamus or prohibition or by application for stay, even if the district court expressly found the double jeopardy issue frivolous. It is reasonable to assume, however, that this decision will result in a diminution in the incidence of pretrial double
jeopardy appeals.
B.

Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

In United States v. Jones,9 2 the Fifth Circuit decided a governmental
appeal from a district court order denying enforcement of an Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) summons served on an accountant. The summons
required the accountant to give testimony and produce documents relating to the income tax liability of the Hortons, owners of two small businesses. The district court held that the records were not subject to compelled disclosure under the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination because the records remained in the constructive possession
of the taxpayers even though in the physical custody of the accountant.
The business records were delivered to the accountant in four garbage
bags after an audit of these voluntarily produced records led the auditing
agent to conclude that a substantial understatement of income in three
calendar years existed. When efforts to settle the matter proved unsuccessful, the case was referred for criminal prosecution which led to the
issuance of a summons. The district court upheld the taxpayers' claim
that the records were personal, private papers subject to the protection of
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
The propriety of the district court's order depended upon an interpre90.
91.
92.

See note 87 supra, and accompanying text.
611 F.2d at 988.
630 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1980).
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tation of Couch v. United States," which held that the privilege against
self-incrimination would not bar enforcement of summons when the taxpayer effectively surrendered possession of documents to her accountant.
As in Couch, the Fifth Circuit held that the element of compulsion
against the taxpayer was lacking since the summons was directed against
the taxpayer's accountant. The court also emphasized the principle that
the privilege is personal as opposed to protecting the information one
might possess. The taxpayers argued that the factual circumstances were
sufficient to sustain invocation of the privilege in light of the following
language in Couch: "Yet situations may well arise where constructive possession is so clear or the relinquishment of possession is so temporary and
insignificant as to leave the personal compulsions upon the accused substantially intact."'" Reversing the district court's order, the court refused
to find the type of "constructive possession" that would leave personal
compulsion against thetaxpayers intact because: (1) There was no "mere
fleeting" divestment of possession since the accountant possessed the
records for five or six months before the summons issued; (2) the accountant was not simply a bailee who had no knowledge of the contents of the
records but was instead a person to whom the documents had been delivered with expectation that they would be utilized in settling the taxpayers' difficulties with the IRS. Because these factors suggested the absence
of the essential ingredient of personal compulsion-the sine qua non of
the fifth amendment claim-the Fifth Circuit directed that the summons
be enforced.
A much different type of self-incrimination claim was resolved in
United States v. Dohm,95 in which the en banc court was faced with the
question of whether the government's use at trial of statements made at a
pretrial bail hearing violated the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. In resolving the question, the court declined the suggestion of
dissenting Judge Tate to create a "use immunity" for testimony at bail
hearings through utilization of the court's supervisory powers."
DEA agents met with Dohm and a confederate to discuss the purchase
of cocaine. Two days later, a sale was ostensibly consummated at Dohm's
house. After the undercover agent left the premises, he gave a prearranged signal to other agents who entered the residence, arrested Dohm,
and seized the cocaine. At the subsequent bail hearing, the defendant was
advised of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel and was
further cautioned that any statements could be used against him in later
proceedings. After Dohm was questioned about his employment and
93.
94.
95.
96.

409 U.S. 322 (1973).
Id. at 333.
618 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane).
Id. at 1176.
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background, the DEA agent was asked about the extent of Dohm's participation in the offense. When the agent testified that Dohm had indicated
an ability to supply one or two kilos of cocaine on a regular basis, Dohm
blurted out that he lacked this capacity, and he later stated that it took
almost two weeks to procure the cocaine that was seized.
The Fifth Circuit refused to hold that these incriminating statements
were necessarily involuntary and coerced, and rejected the contention
that, because they were made to secure reasonable bail, they were "compelled" as a matter of law. Nor did the court agree that the arguably
analogous decision of Simmons v. United States97 was applicable. While
testimony in a suppression hearing necessarily goes to the ultimate facts
in issue, only two of the criteria for determining release on bail deal with
the circumstances of the offense. Nor would consideration of those factors
call for a defendant's explanation. In any event, since a defendant in custody is not required to make any statements, when he voluntarily elects
to testify in support of a bail application, that testimony may be admissible at trial provided that appropriate warnings are given. Because the
magistrate's warnings were confusing-Dohm was told that the magistrate did not know how any statements could be used against him and
that "technically" the government would not use such statements against
him-the court refused to find that Dohm knowingly and intelligently
waived the privilege against self-incrimination. His conviction was accordingly reversed and remanded for a new trial.
United States v. Aguilar 8 involved consideration of the interplay between the privilege against self-incrimination and other rights protected
by double jeopardy considerations. In Anguilar, a number of indictees
stood trial for conspiracy to distribute cocaine. At the conclusion of the
government's case in chief, one defendant announced her decision to take
the stand, thereby precipitating motions for severance or mistrial by a
number of her codefendants, which motions were denied. After concluding her testimony, during which she was cross-examined by counsel for
codefendant Morejon, her counsel announced his intention to comment in
argument about Morejon's failure to testify.
These circumstances presented the court with a classic "De Luna" dilemma.99 On the one hand, Morejon was entitled to exercise his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination without being prejudiced
by any direct or indirect comment regarding his use of the privilege. On
the other hand, counsel was under a duty to emphasize his client's willingness to take the stand and to give testimony in support of a defense
97. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
98. 610 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1980).
99. De Luna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962).
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that was incompatible with that asserted on behalf of a nontestifying defendant. The trial court's decision to sever the testifying defendant from
the trial was affirmed on all counts. The Fifth Circuit held that De Luna
did not foreclose the exercise of discretion by the trial court concerning
who should be severed to avoid the dilemma. By severing the testifying
defendant, the trial court assured that no prejudice would inure to the
nontestifying defendant through invocation of the privilege against selfincrimination. Nor would retrial of the severed defendant be barred
under the double jeopardy clause. Termination of the proceedings by severance was necessiated in order to protect the fifth amendment rights of
the nontestifying codefendant.
C. Brady
The due process clause of the fifth amendment was litigated in Martinez v. Wainwright,00 in which the Fifth Circuit held that the failure to
produce a homicide victim's "rap sheet" pursuant to specific defense requests constituted a violation of due process under Brady v. Maryland0 '
and its progeny. The court accordingly affirmed the district court's conditional grant of the writ of habeas corpus.
In convicting Martinez of second degree murder, the trial jury rejected
his testimony that the victim had boasted of his criminal record before
drawing a gun and initiating a considerable amount of gunplay, which
ultimately led to his demise. Before and during trial, petitioner had requested that prosecuting authorities produce the rap sheet of the victim.
In response, the prosecuting attorney assured the court that all known
avenues for obtaining the rap sheet had been exhausted and that he had
no knowledge that a rap sheet existed.
It was later disclosed that the victim had an extensive criminal record,
including a homicide charge and three drug-related convictions, and that
the rap sheet had been in the medical examiner's office throughout the
trial. The court held that the defense had satisfied the three elements
required to establish the due process violation alleged to flow from the
failure to reply to a specific defense request for information: (1) that the
evidence has been suppressed by the prosecution; (2) that the suppressed
evidence is favorable to the defense; and (3) that it is material. 102 The
court rejected the argument that the prosecutor did not suppress the evi100. 621 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1980).
101. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
102. 373 U.S. at 87; 427 U.S. at 104-07. See also United States v. Preston, 608 F.2d 626,
637 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940 (1980), quoting United States v. Delk, 586
F.2d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 1978)).
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dence because he was not personally aware of its existence,10 3 particularly
in light of the fact that a subpoena for the rap sheet had been directed to
the medical examiner's office. Even though the misrepresentations of the
prosecutor were negligent, not intentional, the court ruled that the purposes of Brady would be undermined by a contrary holding respecting
whether the prosecution had suppressed evidence.
The court proceeded to examine state rules of evidence and found that
the information on the rap sheet was material and useful to the defense
whether or not the rap sheet itself could have been admitted. Because the
suppression was material and favorable, the failure to produce it deprived
Martinez of a fair trial.
In United States v. Gaston,"" the defendant's conviction was vacated
on the basis of Brady'0 violations. The assignment of error was based
upon the failure of the district court to undertake an in camera inspection of certain interview reports commonly knowns as 302s. Preliminarily,
defendant complained that the 302s for two critical witnesses should have
been produced as Jencks Act'"s material, and further argued that it was
error for the district court to fail to examine the reports in camera. The
court held that any error in this regard was harmless in light of its disposition of the Brady claim.
In vacating defendant's conviction, the court found that the district
court improperly relied on prosecutorial assurances that the reports of
interviews did not contain Brady material. Although precedent existed
for upholding the failure of the trial court to make an in camera inspection,107 particularly when the material was sought solely for impeachment
purposes, ' " the court considered the following factors to be critical: (1)
the Brady request was not a blanket one but was a specific request for
particular documents; (2) no evidentiary hearing was held concerning the
contents of the reports; (3) the statements were not produced as Jencks
103.

See United States v. Deutsch, 475 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1973).

104. 608 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1979).
105. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
106. The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976), requires production upon defense application of any "statement" within the scope of the subject matter of the direct examination of
a government witness who has testified. The name of the statute is derived from the decition in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). The law defines "statement" as: "(1) a
written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by
him (2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical or other recording, or a transcription thereof,

which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said witness to an
agent of the Government and recorded contemporaneously with the making of such oral
statement. . . ." 18 U.S.C. §§ 3500(e)(1),(2)(1976).
107. See United States v. Harris, 458 F.2d 670 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 888
(1972).
108. See Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 222 (5th Cir. 1975)(en banc), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 911 (1976).
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Act material; (4) the reports were not sought for impeachment purposes
only but as potentially exculpatory evidence as well; (5) the evidence
against the accused was not so overwhelming as to justify a finding of
harmless error. The cause was therefore remanded so that the district
court could examine the 302s and determine whether a new trial should
be granted.
V.

SIXTH AMENDMENT

The sixth amendment right to counsel was at issue in United States v.
Martinez1 " and Gray v. Estelle.110 In Gray, the habeas corpus petitioner
attacked his murder conviction, arguing that his right to conflict-free
counsel had been denied under circumstances fairly characterized as bizarre. Although an attorney was appointed for Gray following his indictment, he received a visit from an attorney-businessman named Proctor
who related that in his capacity as businessman, he had preferred felony
theft charges against Gray. Hoping to acquire valuable criminal trial experience, Proctor offered to drop the theft charge if Gray agreed to retain
him in defense of the murder indictment. Proctor later advised the trial
court that his fee had not been paid. Consequently, he was appointed in
hopes that he could receive some payment for his services.
On the day of trial, Proctor advised the trial court about the potential
conflict at the behest of the prosecutor who had discovered the existence
of the problem. The judge elicited the fact that Gray knew of the theft
charge but understood that the criminal complaint had been dismissed.
In fact, Proctor had requested its dismissal although it was still pending
at that time. Neverthless, Gray indicated his desire that Proctor continue
with his defense. Seven years after his conviction and the imposition of a
seventy-five year sentence, Gray filed a petition for the writ of habeas
corpus.
The court noted the established principle that the sixth amendment
right to counsel guarantees the right to counsel not laboring under conflicts of interest, subject to the defendant's right to waive any conflict if it
is both voluntary and a knowing and intelligent act done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.""' In the
context of state criminal proceedings, the court held that since the original record in the state court was silent, the state had the burden of establishing: (1) that the defendant was aware of the existence of conflict; (2)
that he realized the consequences of continued representation by counsel
109. 630 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1980).
110. 616 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1980).
111. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272
(5th Cir. 1975).
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having a conflict; and (3) that he was aware of his right to obtain other
counsel."12 Although the state successfully demonstrated defendant's
awareness of the conflict, it failed to show that Gray was aware either of
the potential dangers of continued representation by Proctor, or of his
right to obtain other counsel. The denial of the habeas corpus petition
was accordingly reversed.
The defendant in United States v. Martinez"s was represented by
counsel with considerably more ethical sensitivity. Defense counsel was
surprised to see a former client in the courtroom as a prosecution witness
at the beginning of the trial, since his name was not on the list of witnesses provided by the prosecution. Counsel immediately advised the
court that he had represented the government witness on charges related
to those on trial, and indicated that he would feel uncomfortable in crossexamining him. The court decided that no conflict existed and ordered
the trial to proceed.
In reversing defendant's conviction, the court properly refused to limit
its conflict rules to situations where counsel concurrently represented
both the defendant on trial and a prosecution witness. Although the record indicated that a vigorous cross-examination of the former client was
undertaken, the court ruled that counsel labored under an actual conflict
of interest since his duty as an advocate to the defendant on trial conflicted with his duty to preserve the confidences of his former client. Reversal was accordingly mandated by application of the "actual conflict"
rule:
If a criminal defendant is represented at trial by an attorney, either appointed or retained, who labors under an actual, and not merely potential, conflict of interest the defendant has been denied effective assistance of counsel as a matter of law; and, unless he has knowingly and
intelligently waived his Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free representation, reversal is automatic. No prejudice need be shown."'
In contrast to the number of cases in which courts have considered
comment upon the accused's invocation of the fifth amendment privileges
against self-incrimination, there are relatively few cases in which courts
have addressed comments that penalize a defendant for exercising his
sixth amendment right to counsel. United States v. McDonald"' provided the Fifth Circuit with an opportunity to add to this aspect of sixth
amendment jurisprudence.
Evidence introduced at McDonald's trial on counterfeiting offenses in112.

Zuck v. Alabama, 588 F.2d 436 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979).

113.

630 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1980).

114.
115.

Id. at 362 (citations omitted).
620 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1980).
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dicated that he and his accomplices had burned a large quantity of nonpassable counterfeit bills at defendant's residence. Ashes and a few unburned bills were discarded near McDonald's house where they were retrived by Secret Service agents who had the premises under surveillance.
A search warrant was executed several hours later but no useful evidence
was seized. Testimony that McDonald's lawyer was present when the
search took place formed the predicate for a prosecutorial argument
which implied that the attorney at least tolerated and might have aided
and abetted the destruction of evidence:
I suggest to you ladies and gentlemen, I'm not going to tell you what my
opinion is, but I suggest to you if Jimmy McDonald knew all this was
going on, and had his lawyer out there three hours later, I believe that

there would be sufficient time to dispose of any ashes or any evidence, if
you were so inclined.116
Finding that the implication "struck at the jugular" of defendant's exculpatory story, the court reversed, adopting a standard of inquiry like
that applied to comments upon a defendant's exercise of fifth amendment
rights, i.e., whether the questioning and comment was directed at defendant's essential story or whether it related to a collateral matter. The
court observed:
Comments that penalize a defendant for the exercise of his right to counsel and that also strike at the core of his defense cannot be considered
harmless error. The right to counsel is so basic to all other rights that it
must be accorded very careful treatment. Obvious and insidious attacks
on the exercise of this constitutional right are antithetical to the concept
of a fair trial and are reversible error.111
VI.

FmEDEAL RuLEs oF EVIDENCE

Three significant decisions were rendered construing the Federal Rules
of Evidence in a criminal context. These will be of particular interest to
the practitioner. In United States v. Cain,11 8 the Fifth Circuit reviewed a
conviction for the interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle. The
defendant contended that the court erred in admitting an exhibit purporting to reflect his escape from a federal penal institution on the date
the vehicle was reported stolen. The report was made in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity and met the other criteria for admissibility under Rule 803(6)19 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as an
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 562 (emphasis added by court).
Id. at 564.
615 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1980).
Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
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exception to the hearsay rule. The report was not admissible under the
hearsay exception embodied in Rule 803(8),120 however, because it was a
matter observed by law enforcement personnel that was sought to be admitted in a criminal case. The court refused to countenance a "back
door" exception under Rule 803(6) for records specifically excluded from
the operation of Rule 803(8). The conviction was reversed and the cause
remanded for a new trial because the court was unable to characterize the
error as harmless.
United States v. Roberts1 1 concerned a consideration of the admission
of extrinsic offense evidence under the frequently litigated Rule 404(b)"'
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The issue arose when the government
announced its intention to introduce defendant's prior conviction of a
gambling offense as part of its case in chief in a prosecution for conspiracy to operate a gambling business and various other related offenses.
The defense argued that unless it raised the issue of intent, such prejudicial evidence should not be received. The trial court admitted the prior
conviction and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that under the circumRecords of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or
data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses,
made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if
it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum,
report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian
or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business"
as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession,
occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
FED.

R.

EVID.

803(6).

120. Rule 803(8), Federal Rules of Evidence, provides:
Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of
the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as
to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases
matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in
civil actions and proceedings and against the government in criminal cases, factual
findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by
law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
121. 619 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1980).
122. Rule 404(b), Federal Rules of Evidence, provides:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
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stances the plea of not guilty sufficiently raised the issue of intent.
The court concluded that the precise question in issue had been reserved in previous decisions because in each, the government had some
basis besides defendant's plea for believing that criminal intent would be
denied. Indeed, precedent indicated that extrinsic offense evidence should
generally not be admitted unless intent was actively contested because
"the incremental probative value of the extrinsic offense is inconsequen'
tial when compared to its prejudice. '"I"
Nevertheless, the court affirmed
the conviction for two princpal reasons. First, the court drew a distinction
between conspiracy and substantive criminal offenses, underscoring the
particular difficulties inherent in proving intent in the former. The court
reasoned that without independent evidence of intent, other circumstantial evidence might be insufficient to overcome a motion for judgment of
acquittal. The court was also concerned that unless this evidence was introduced as part of the government's case in chief, a defendant might rest
without presenting any evidence and argue that absence of criminal intent to the jury. In that event, the opportunity for introduction of extrinsic offense evidence on rebuttal would be foreclosed. Second, the court
noted that defense counsel did not affirmatively remove the issue of intent from the case when he made application to exclude the extrinsic offense evidence, but merely indicated that he would not affirmatively contest the issue. Thus, the burden on the prosecution to prove criminal
intent was not diminished.
While Roberts does not establish a per se rule of admissiblity of extrinsic offense evidence in conspiracy cases, it makes the task of securing exclusion considerably more difficult. The prejudice inuring to a defendant
from the admission of extrinsic offense evidence can be avoided, however,
if a defense not based on lack of intent is available. To avoid application
of Roberts, a defendant cannot merely rest on a not guilty plea but must
take some affirmative step to eliminate the criminal intent issue from the
case.
Proper application of Rule 404(b) was also addressed in United States
v. Jimenez,1 4 in which the court reviewed defendant's conviction for distribution of heroin after the jury rejected his entrapment defense. During
his direct examination, defendant testified that he had never trafficked in
drugs before the transaction for which he was on trial. On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned him about his purported possession of cocaine approximately one year following his arrest on the heroin charge.
In applying Rule 404(b), the Jimenez court first examined the evidence
123. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 914 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 920 (1979).
124. 613 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1980).
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suggesting that defendant had in fact possessed cocaine. In contrast to
Roberts,'2" the government had no conviction to offer, although this is no
bar to the admissibility of extrinsic offense evidence if the offer of proof
would be of sufficient value to withstand a motion for directed verdict.1 2
All that was proffered, however, were prosecutorial accusations. Thus, the
threshold predicate for admissibility under Rule 404(b) was not satisfied.
Not only did the court reverse the conviction, but it ruled that the alleged
possession of cocaine could not be explored at a retrial even if the government was prepared to prove defendant's knowing possession of the substance. Because the extrinsic offense was at least one older than the offense on trial, it was of limited relevance to the issue of his predisposition
to distribute narcotics. The probative value was further diminished because it followed, rather than preceded, the drug transaction for which he
was tried. Thus, the asserted nexus was too attentuated logically to justify admission under Rule 404(b).
VII.

SENENCING

In addition to United States v. Rodriguez,127 the Fifth Circuit decided
three other cases that have particular significance in the area of sentencs
ing. The first case1 2 8 involved construction of a Youth Corrections Act"2
conviction which formed the basis for an indictment for possession of firearms by a convicted felon. 8s The government contended that the production of a certified copy of the judgment of conviction shifted the burden
of proving an unconditional discharge to the defense."' The court rejected this contention and held that defendant's failure to produce a certificate of discharge was of no legal significance. Since the trial court imposing the Youth Corrections Act sentence had acted under a section
carrying a maximum penalty of six years' imprisonment,8 2 the court
ruled that his conviction was automatically expunged upon his unconditional discharge at the expiration of the six-year period whether or not a
certificate was produced. The firearms convictions were accordingly reversed because of the failure to establish a prior unexpunged felony con125. 619 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1980).
126. 582 F.2d at 913; United States v. Byers, 600 F.2d 1130, 1132 (5th Cir. 1979).
127. 612 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1980)(en banc).
128. United States v. Arrington, 618 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1980).
129. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1976).
130. 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a)(1)(1976).
131. 18 U.S.C. § 5021(a) (1976) provides: "Upon the unconditional discharge by the
Commission of a committed youth offender before the expiration of the maximum sentence
imposed upon him, the conviction shall be automatically set aside and the Commission shall
issue to the youth offender a certificate to that effect."
132. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5010(b), (c).
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viction as an integral element of the offense charged. 33
Another facet of the sentencing process was presented in United States
v. Robbins,13 1 in which the contention was made that the trial court's sentence was improperly based on its belief that defendant had fabricated
his trial testimony. Even though the Supreme Court has authoritatively
held that a sentencing judge could properly consider the falsity of defendant's testimony in determining a proper sentence, 138 the trial court went
on to declare that a court could not lawfully base a sentence solely upon
its belief that a defendant had lied under oath at trial. The Fifth Circuit
noted that the sentencing judge had clearly expressed his disbelief in defendant's trial testimony in imposing a substantially heavier sentence
than the codefendant received. Upon its examination of the pre-sentence
report, the court also observed that the sentence imposed was much heavier than that recommended by the probation office. Because there was no
other detrimental information in the record on which to explain the substantially heavier sentence against the appellant, the sentence was vacated and the cause remanded for resentencing in light of all pertinent
factors.
The eighth amendment proscription against the infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment was the source of petitioner's attack on his life sentence in Terrebonne v. Blackburn.3 6 Terrebonne was a twenty-one year
old addict who was approached about the availability of narcotics by law
enforcement agents and their paid informant. Apparently, Terrebonne
was not in possession of any narcotics at the time, but he offered to use
his connection to "score a bundle." When the connection appeared, government-supplied money and twenty-two packets of heroin exchanged
hands, with Terrebonne receiving two or three packets for his trouble. He
was later tried and convicted for distributing heroin after a trial jury rejected his entrapment defense. Pursuant to Louisiana law, he received a
mandatory life sentence.
Terrebonne's essential contention was not that Louisiana lacked authority under the eighth amendment to impose a life sentence for trafficking in heroin. He asserted that the imposition of a life sentence under the
circumstances was so disproportionate as to constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. Because the district court erroneously construed the petition
as an attack on the facial validity of the statute in question, the Fifth
Circuit ruled that the dismissal of the habeas petition could be affirmed
only if another basis for it existed.
133. See United States v. Barfield, 527 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Marzett, 526 F.2d 277, 278 (5th Cir. 1976).
134. 623 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1980).
135. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978).
136. 624 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1980).
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The disproportionality analysis undertaken by the court involved three
steps: (1) an examination of defendant's crime in order to assess his culpability and the degree of danger posed to society by his conduct; (2) a
comparison of the actual sentence imposed with that which would be actually imposed in other jurisdictions; and (3) a comparison of the sentencing jurisdiction's treatment of defendant with its punishment of other
18 7
criminals.
The court emphasized that judging Terrebonne's offense in the context
of the societal harm caused by drug distribution as a whole would logically eliminate the application of the proportionality principle as applied
to individual offenders. Even though a legislative body constitutionally
could enact a statutory scheme providing punishment based upon its assessment of the societal harm caused by the proscribed conduct, the proportionality principle still could operate as applied to individual cases.
Upholding the facial validity of the penal statute would not obviate the
need for an analysis of the gradations of culpability that exist within the
scope of the statute. Imposition of a mandatory punishment on a particular individual might so deviate from the notion of just deserts as to
render the sanction grossly disproportionate to the offense, thereby justifying relief under the authority of the eighth amendment. Because the
district court misconceived the thrust of the constitutional challenge and
because no independent ground existed upon which to justify dismissal of
Terrebonne's petition, the district court's judgment was vacated and the
cause remanded for further proceedings.
In Stephens v. Zant,'" the petitioner attacked the denial of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus, contending that the jury had considered an unconstitutional aggravating circumstance which led to the imposition of a death sentence.'3 9 At trial, the jury was permitted to consider
four statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) that the offense was committed by one who had escaped from lawful custody; 40 (2) that the offense was committed by one having a prior capital felony conviction;"4
that the offense was committed by one having a substantial history of
serious assaultive convictions;' 4 ' and (4) that the offense was outrageously
137. See Rummell v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978)(en banc), aff'd, 4451 U.S. 263
(1980).
138. 631 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1980).
139. The other contentions raised were that his conviction violated the double jeopardy
clause of the fifth amendment, that his rights under the eighth amendment were contravened because closing arguments were not transcribed, and that the jury was not properly
instructed that a life sentence could be recommended even if statutory aggravating circumstances were found. These contentions were rejected by the court.

140.
141.
142.

GA. CODE ANN.
GA. CODE ANN.

Id.

§ 27-2534.1(b)(9)(1978).
§ 27-2534.1(b)(1)(1978).
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or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman. 1 The jury found that the first
three aggravating circumstances had been established but not the fourth.
Before petitioner's conviction and sentence were. reviewed by the Supreme Court of Georgia, that court held that the "history of serious assaultive convictions" aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally
vague. "4' The court nevertheless affirmed petitioner's conviction and sentence, holding that there was an adequate evidentiary basis1 4for
the jury's
5
finding of the presence of other aggravating circumstances.
In a state habeas corpus action, petitioner challenged the validity of the
finding that the second aggravating circumstance had been established,
i.e., the offense was committed by one having a prior capital felony conviction. The basis for this contention was that at the time of the offense
for which he received the death penalty, he had not been convicted of a
capital felony. The argument was rejected by the Georgia Supreme Court,
which construed the statute 1"6 as requiring jury consideration of peti-

tioner's record as of the time of sentencing.1" 7 The argument on appeal
from the denial of the federal habeas petition was slightly different: that
the presence of an unconstitutional aggravating circumstance1 4 8 coupled
with the questionable interpretation of another aggravating circumstance' 9 created such a potential for intrusion of arbitrary influences as
to deny petitioner his constitutional rights and to require vacation of the
death sentence.
The court refused to review the Georgia Supreme Court's interpretation of the "prior felony conviction" aggravating circumstance and thus
posed the dispositive question as follows:
[W]hether the death penalty was invalid under the Constitution because
it was imposed when one of the aggravating circumstances was later held
to be unconstitutional even though there were two other aggravating circumstances, either of which by itself would be legally sufficient to permit
the jury to impose the death penalty and as to both of which there is no
uncertainty. 150
In vacating the death sentence, the court ruled that the consideration
of the unconstitutional aggravating circumstance could have decisively af143. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(7)(1978).
144. Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 540, 224 S.E.2d 386, 391 (1976).
145. Stephens v. State, 237 Ga. 259, 261-62, 227 S.E.2d 261, 263, cert. denied 429 U.S.
986 (1976).
146. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(1)(1978).
147. Stephens v. Hopper, 241 Ga. 596, 602-03, 247 S.E.2d 92, 96-97, cert. denied, 439
U.S. 991 (1978).

148. See note 5 supra, and accompanying text.
149. See note 4 supra, and accompanying text.
150.

631 F.2d at 406.
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fected the verdict and hence was not "rationally reviewable,"' 5 1 whether
or not sufficient evidence existed to support the jury's findings of two
other aggravating circumstances. The issue of the unconstitutionally
vague aggravating circumstance authorized the jury's consideration of
prior convictions that would not have otherwise been before it, and the
instruction on this circumstance focused the jury's attention on an extremely prejudicial matter. Because the jury could have returned a life
sentence even after finding the presence of one or more aggravating circumstances, the court could not be certain that the unconstitutional circumstance played a critical role in the imposition of the death sentence.

151.

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).

